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Police pursuits are a topic nearly every department in the United States either 
has or will have to deal with. Some view police pursuits as a necessary and effective 
part of the law enforcement function to be engaged in regardless of the price, while 
others view them as extremely dangerous and never worth the risk.  The Precision 
Intervention Technique (PIT) is an effective means of bringing pursuits to an end, not 
just slowing the driver down. Fear of civil litigation has always been a concern, and 
officers should always measure their actions against the test of reasonableness; 
however, current court decisions, particularly Scott v. Harris, have ruled favorably for 
such use of force actions taken by police.  Structured policy and training is an essential 
part of adopting the maneuver.  With the exception of financial barriers and time 
required for training, the culture has never been more favorable to give officers this 
added tool for accomplishing the portion of the law enforcement mission related to the 
apprehension of fleeing suspects. 
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 The primary decision associated with the high-speed police pursuit of fleeing 
suspects is whether the benefits of potential apprehension outweigh the risks of 
endangering police officers, the public, and the suspects in the chase. On the one hand, 
too many restrictions placed on a police department’s use of pursuit could place the 
public at risk from dangerous individuals escaping apprehension. On the other hand, 
insufficient controls of police pursuits could result in unnecessary accidents and injuries. 
The pursuit intervention technique, also known as precision immobilization technique 
and commonly referred to as the PIT maneuver, is one method of ending pursuits, and 
departments should examine, individually, whether it is appropriate for use within their 
community.  
 The pursuit intervention technique, or PIT, is a method of bringing a car to a stop 
against the driver’s wishes, in a somewhat controlled manner.  It is a method of 
conducting a forcible stop. The PIT was originally popularized in the 1970s by BSR 
Incorporated, an advanced driver training school in Summit Point, West Virginia. Tom 
Milner, a BSR co-owner at the time, brought the technique from Germany, where it was 
used by the German police. The technique was translated from a German book titled 
The Hunter and the Hunted. PIT gained popularity during the 1990s, and the technique 
was refined to reduce the violent ramming called for in earlier variations of the 
maneuver. A variation has been used by the Secret Service since 1965 for VIP 
protection during motorcades (Alpert, personal communication, March 23, 2009). 
Examining the statistics compiled by the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA) and those of one local department indicated the occurrence of 
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dangerous pursuits entering or originating in the jurisdiction of reporting departments 
has fluctuated, but over the past ten years, pursuits have been on the rise (National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration [NHTSA], 2008; Huntsville Police Department, 
2009).  These pursuits endanger the community and the officers involved, as well as the 
suspect.  For everyone involved, it is in the best interest to end the pursuit as quickly as 
possible.  Adopting a policy whereby officers could, under certain criteria, utilize the PIT 
maneuver would give them another tool generally not afforded to them. 
The PIT maneuver is dangerous and should be placed on the Use of Force 
Continuum near the top, with other potentially deadly force options.  However, when 
utilized under certain restricted circumstances dictated by policy, the likelihood of a 
crash resulting in death is decreased (Georgia Association of Chiefs of Police Executive 
Board, 2006).  Recent court decisions, particularly Scott v. Harris, supports law 
enforcement’s use of this level of force to bring dangerous pursuits to an end.  
Departments that have the budget should develop policy dictating the use of the pursuit 
intervention technique and provide training to its officers on how to properly execute the 
maneuver. The authorization to utilize the maneuver will give officers another option to 
stop dangerous suspects. It will give them another “tool” in their “tool box.” 
POSITION 
This paper is not intended as an instruction manual on how to perform the PIT 
maneuver, but for explanation purposes, the mechanics of the maneuver are explained. 
The pursuing vehicle approaches the pursued vehicle from the rear and causes its front 
bumper or quarter panel to contact the rear bumper or quarter panel of the pursued 
vehicle.  The pursuing vehicle then steers slightly in the direction of the pursued vehicle, 
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pushing the vehicle, causing its rear tires to lose traction with the roadway and begin to 
slide around.  The pursued vehicle loses the ability to steer and typically rotates 90 to 
180 degrees prior to coming to a stop either on or off of the roadway.      
While some officers may experience altered time perception and report after a 
pursuit the feeling that everything was in slow motion, things actually happen quickly in 
a pursuit.  One study conducted by the Pursuit Management Task Force, a task force 
created by the National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center, Western 
Region, found that more than 50% of all pursuit collisions (as reported by agencies 
statewide) [each of nine states] occurred during the first two minutes of a pursuit.  More 
than 70% of all collisions occurred before the sixth minute of a pursuit. This information 
is of significant importance in that it illustrates that a pursuit technology must be able to 
be rapidly deployed and utilized to have a significant impact in preventing pursuit-
related collisions (as cited in U.S. Dept of Justice National Institute of Justice, 1998). 
The PIT maneuver can be immediately deployed by any officer trained in its use the 
moment defined criteria are met, as opposed to relying on luck and a guess in choosing 
where the suspect is going to travel in hopes of beating him to the location and setting 
up road spikes or other means of termination.  Adoption of the maneuver by a 
department for its officers puts some control back in the hands of the officers as they 
can pick where and when to end the pursuit.  
Several cases over the past two decades have concluded with favorable rulings 
towards law enforcement.  First, in 1994, the Texas Supreme Court decided in the case 
of City of Lancaster v. Chamber (1994) that officers and departments are both immune 
from liability when damages are sought, as long as the officer was acting in good faith, 
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conducting his duties as assigned, and at his discretion.  As long as an officer does not 
knowingly violate the law or act “plainly incompetent,” this is a grant of qualified 
immunity. For day-to-day activities and decisions, qualified or official immunity protects 
individuals. Qualified immunity is the term used for a public servant’s defense when a 
suit is brought in federal court. A similar defense is available in state lawsuits, which is 
known as official immunity. 
On March 6, 1988, officers in New Jersey encountered a situation that led to 
another important court decision in 1994, Fagan v. City of Vineland (1994).  This case 
involved an officer who observed a passenger standing up in the vehicle through a t-top 
roof. The driver of the vehicle refused to stop for police, disregarded several stop signs, 
and increased the vehicle’s speed. The driver eventually struck another vehicle. Two 
people in the other vehicle died, and one person in the pursued vehicle was injured. The 
Third Circuit Court ruled that the conduct of the police did not “shock the conscience” 
(Fagan v. City of Vineland, 1994).  The officers were granted summary judgment.  The 
lower court’s decision to also grant the city summary judgment, however, was reversed, 
which left the city open for a civil suit.  An interview with the city attorney for Vineland, 
New Jersey revealed that a suit was filed, but a jury found no fault on the city’s part and 
awarded no damages to the plaintiff (Verderose, personal communication, March 23, 
2009).  
In the case of Sacramento v. Lewis (1998), officers observed a speeding 
motorcycle and attempted to pull over the driver. The motorcycle driver refused to stop, 
which resulted in a pursuit. The chase, which lasted under two minutes, terminated 
when the motorcycle driver lost control. When the driver and passenger of the 
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motorcycle were thrown from the motorcycle, the pursuing officer attempted to stop but 
struck and killed the passenger where he lay on the ground. The court ruled that the 
officer’s conduct did not meet the “shocks the conscience” test. The significance of this 
case is that unless it could be proven that the officer intended to harm the suspect or 
worsen their plight, it would be extremely difficult to prove liability under the 14th 
Amendment.  
In another case, Fiest v. Simonson (2000), officer Simonson attempted to pull 
over a suspected stolen vehicle. The driver of the vehicle refused to stop, and after a 
lengthy high speed pursuit, which went the wrong way on several one way streets, the 
pursued vehicle struck another vehicle on the shoulder at an approximate speed of 100 
miles per hour. The driver of the innocent-third-party vehicle, Brian Keith Fiest, was 
killed.   A three-judge panel of the U.S. Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in July of 
2000 that the officers had many opportunities to weigh the danger of the chase, and due 
to the dangers involved, the officers should have discontinued the pursuit.  The court 
found the actions of the officers did “shock the conscience” and violated the innocent 
driver’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.  Nearly one year later to the day, 
however, the complete panel to the same court overruled that decision during its 
consideration of Helseth v Burch (2001).  In this case, Everett Contois who was being 
pursued by officer John Burch, struck Helseth, an innocent third party, causing the 
death of Helseth’s passenger and leaving Helseth a quadaplegic  (Helseth v. Burch, 
2001). 
Finally, the most recent court decision that gives rise to much enthusiasm and 
encouragement in support of pursuits by law enforcement’s is Scott v. Harris (2007).  
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On the night of March 29, 2001, a Georgia police officer clocked 19-year-old Victor 
Harris's car speeding at 73 miles-per-hour in a 55 mile-per-hour speed zone.  The 
officer turned on his flashing blue lights as he followed Harris's car, but Harris refused to 
slow down. Other police officers, including Deputy Timothy Scott, joined in the pursuit.  
At one point in the chase, Harris pulled his car into a parking lot and was nearly trapped 
by police cars.  He managed to get his car back on the highway, colliding with Deputy 
Scott's car in the process. Deputy Scott, leading the pursuit at that point, then requested 
and received permission to disable Harris's car, and he proceeded to push his bumper 
into Harris's vehicle.  Harris lost control of his car, ran off the road, crashed, and 
suffered injuries that left him a quadriplegic. Harris filed suit, alleging, among other 
things, that Deputy Scott used excessive force to end the chase and thereby 
unreasonably seized Harris in violation of the Fourth Amendment (protection against 
unreasonable search and seizures). Deputy Scott responded by filing a motion for 
summary judgment based on a defense of qualified immunity (Kessler, 2008). 
The District Court denied Deputy Scott's motion for summary judgment because 
it believed that the case presented "material issues of fact" that a jury would have to 
resolve.  The court first decided that Harris had been seized.  The Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed the District Court's decision to deny Deputy Scott summary judgment against 
Harris.  In the end, however, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals 
decision.  The Supreme Court found that Harris moved "shockingly fast" down narrow 
roads, "force[d] cars" to the shoulder, and engaged in "hazardous maneuvers" as he led 
the police in a, "Hollywood-style car chase of the most frightening sort, placing police 
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officers and innocent bystanders alike at great risk of serious injury” (Kessler, 2008, p. 
427).   
The Supreme Court next held that, given the facts of the chase, Deputy Scott's 
seizure of Harris was objectively reasonable and therefore did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.  The Supreme Court balanced Deputy Scott's goal, elimination of the 
"imminent" threat to pedestrians and motorists, with his method, the use of deadly force 
against Harris (Kessler, 2008, p. 428).   Interestingly, video footage is rarely used by the 
Supreme Court in their decision making, but in this case, it was available for them to 
view, and it seems the viewing was instrumental in their final eight to one decision in 
support of Scott.   The justices were able to see with their own eyes what had occurred, 
which was a different story than Harris had presented (Ross, 2008). 
So the ebb and flow of the judicial tide seems to have, at least for now, rotated 
towards supporting law enforcement when it comes to accidents involving injury and 
deaths that occur as a result of a vehicle pursuit.  This does not mean that departments 
should automatically loosen their guidelines on pursuit policy. It should, however, 
encourage departments to examine policies and at least consider the addition of new 
pursuit-ending technologies and techniques, such as spike strips and perhaps the PIT 
maneuver.  Some policy considerations are examined in the next section. 
Time and experience has brought about many departmental regulations on 
pursuits.   According to Walker (2005), similar to police use of force issues, until the 
1970s, there were few, if any, specific policies giving guidance to officers as to 
acceptable circumstances they could engage in during a pursuit. Officers could pursue 
a suspect at will, regardless of the level of the offense or circumstance.  Walker (2005) 
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stated, “High-speed pursuits became part of the culture of policing, with flight, defined 
as a direct challenge to an officer’s authority…. With the development of media 
technology, (helicopters, more mobile cameras), high-speed pursuits became a part of 
the popular culture of policing” (p. 57).  Pursuits were, and still are, glamorized by 
television and cinema.  Now, nearly all departments across the United States have 
some policy outlining the circumstances under which its officers may or may not engage 
in a pursuit. 
Pursuit policies come in two forms: restrictive and judgmental.  Restrictive 
policies are those where “the officer may only pursue given the existence of certain well-
defined criteria” (Pipes, 2001, p.16).  These policies are usually adopted by urban and 
suburban departments.  As it pertains to the PIT maneuver, an example of this would be 
a policy that allows officers to only utilize the maneuver on certain roadways and at 
speeds no greater than a certain limit. Judgmental or discretionary policies are those 
“where the officer may decide whether or not to pursue based upon certain factors” 
(Pipes, 2001, p.16). This allows the officer more latitude in his actions. These policies 
are usually adopted by rural departments or municipal departments that have interstates 
running through them.  As it pertains to the PIT maneuver, a sample policy might read 
that officers will use their own discretion and judgment as to where and when the 
maneuver can be safely deployed based on their training, experience, and the totality of 
environmental factors.  One policy type is not necessarily better than the other.  Each 
department must decide which type of policy is best for its needs and for the community 
it serves.   
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Regardless of which type of policy a department implements, a pursuit policy 
should provide officers guidance for when a pursuit situation occurs.  Officers must be 
trained in the use of any device or technique allowed or endorsed by the department; 
otherwise, a department is vulnerable to “failure to train” lawsuits.  Departments and 
officers should be educated that use of the pursuit intervention technique will be 
considered a Fourth Amendment seizure by the courts and its use must be objectively 
reasonable.  The technique is an attempt to seize control of the vehicle and person or 
persons in the vehicle and must be accomplished by force; therefore, the maneuver 
should be placed on the use of force continuum; however, where it should be placed on 
the continuum is debatable. 
Justice J. Stevens commented in his dissenting opinion in Scott v. Harris (2007) 
that the use of an automobile as a method of seizure may be considered deadly force 
when he wrote “a jury could conclude that Scott unreasonably used deadly force to 
seize Harris by ramming him off the road under the instant circumstances” (Scott v. 
Harris, 2007, p. 8).  The Georgia Ad Hoc Committee asserted that the courts have not 
yet explicitly ruled on whether or not the PIT maneuver is deadly force.  The committee 
offered an opinion after their study, which included a review of their state patrol’s 
statistics and experience, examining the Georgia Tech Research Project and compared 
it to their state law’s definition of deadly force. It was their opinion that the PIT maneuver 
is not deadly force because death or serious injury is not a likely consequence of using 
the PIT maneuver in accordance with proper training and policy (Georgia Association of 
Chiefs of Police Executive Board, 2006). 
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Blankenship and Moneymaker (1997) asserted that policies on forced stops must 
“conform to case law regarding the use of deadly force” (p. 57).   Their opinion is that 
policies outlining procedures for pursuits should be treated like those regulating the use 
of firearms and should limit pursuits to those circumstances in which the suspect 
“presents a clear and present danger to the community if not apprehended” 
(Blankenship and Moneymaker, 1997, p. 57). It should be noted, though, that they also 
said “adopting and enforcing a stringent pursuit policy should not be based solely on the 
desire to avoid litigation. Instead all police activities should be motivated by the utility of 
their actions” (Blankenship and Moneymaker, 1997, p. 58).  Officers must often make 
quick decisions and choose whether to act or not. Included in that choice, the officer 
should always do a cost-benefit analysis.  They should examine the circumstances and 
if the benefits of conducting the chase, maneuver, or technique outweigh the cost of 
incurring the risks associated with it.  Blankenship and Moneymaker (1997) had a 
conservative stance on the use of pursuits, but they also acknowledged their benefit. 
Some pursuits are surrendered quickly by suspects, but other times, they may 
last an hour or more.  Many pursuits are lengthy and travel for miles, while others may 
last for only a block or two.  Some only reach relatively low speeds, and others are 
conducted at very high speeds.  Some pursuits travel roadways changing from 
interstate to the inner city streets and back again.  On many of these streets, there are 
good opportunities to utilize the maneuver, including those at low speeds. Restricting 
the use of the maneuver to only the main thoroughfares, where speeds may increase 
quickly, eliminates many opportunities for officers to shut the pursuit down before it ever 
becomes a high speed pursuit.  Shorden McCloud, a trainer of the maneuver at the 
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Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glenco Georgia, said, “I would steer clear 
of putting a number on the speed at which the maneuver can be done in department 
policies” (McCloud, personal communication, June 29, 2009). 
Placing the maneuver at the highest level on the use of force scale, deadly force, 
may result in the restriction of its use to only the most dire circumstances and felony 
offenses, thus reducing its overall potential benefit.  An example of this would be putting 
an end to the reckless and dangerous driving of a suspect whose only known violation 
is suspicion of driving while intoxicated.  Placing the maneuver too low on the scale 
might lead some to believe it is not all that dangerous, when, under certain 
circumstances, it is quite dangerous.  Due to the fact that the maneuver involves two 
automobiles weighing approximately 2,000 pounds each and there is intentional striking 
and loss of control of one of the vehicles, the potential or risk of death cannot be 
ignored.  It appears that the technique should be placed on the Use of Force scale at 
the same level as impact weapons because impact weapons also carry with their use 
the potential to cause serious bodily injury and death.  However, under most 
circumstances, they are not used with the intention of causing death or serious bodily 
injury.  This is the same for the PIT maneuver.  With the adoption of the technique 
comes the need for a clearly defined policy addressing the varied circumstances that 
the maneuver may be used.    
Similar to the use of a police baton, the level of force the PIT maneuver may be 
considered can vary on the use of force continuum depending on the circumstance 
surrounding its use.  For example, a policy might allow officers to utilize the technique at 
lower speeds, which have less probability for injury or for lesser offenses, such as 
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specified misdemeanors and DWI’s. More serious offenses, such as violent crimes and 
felonies, might be established as criteria justifying the maneuver’s use at higher speeds, 
which carry an increased probability of injury. Departments that decide to adopt the 
maneuver should have verbiage in their policy similar to that of the Georgia Department 
of Public Safety Policy 17.02, which states that that PIT maneuver “should not be used 
until other methods for stopping a fleeing vehicle (e.g. tire deflation devices and 
roadblocks) have been considered and determined not to be feasible” (as cited in 
Georgia Association of Chiefs of Police Executive Board, 2006, p. 31).  If departments 
choose to allow officers to utilize the maneuver by policy, then training should be 
required and provided.  According to Beach (1993), officers should only use the types of 
force they have trained on as “A lack of training is grounds for negligence. Just seeing 
someone else perform a maneuver is not enough.  You must have specific instructions 
and be able to demonstrate how to use it” (p.168). 
COUNTER POSTITION 
Opponents to the use of the PIT maneuver argue that it is too dangerous and 
would open the department up for civil liability.  The cost of training the officers may be 
too high for small budgets.  Many fear legal recourse by injured third-party victims 
against the government for so-called groundless and reckless pursuits. Another 
common argument is that the cost to repair damaged patrol vehicles will be too high.  
Some departments believe the mere adoption of a pro PIT maneuver policy would affect 
the city’s insurance rates or the bond rating for the city. Municipalities are faced with a 
wide range of concerns that can result in liability damages being awarded to a 
petitioner, including matters associated with its police department’s conduct.  They are 
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forced to have insurance to protect themselves.  Insurance companies can raise the 
already expensive premium rates for municipalities or refuse to insure them at all, 
especially if several lawsuits are filed against a police department (Kappeler, 2001). As 
a result, some departments believe the best way to keep their department out of legal 
battles is to establish and enforce extreme restrictions. 
Certainly there are court decisions finding departments at fault.  Some cite the 
cause of failure-to-train officers in the use of weapons or tactics they are deploying.  
Sometimes the lack of training is only brought to light when things go badly and 
someone is injured or killed.  Then it becomes a problem for the officer, department, or 
governmental agency.  Ultimately, though, the taxpayers pay the bill. 
A survey conducted by the National Institute of Municipal Officers gathered data 
from 215 municipalities indicating they had over $4.3 billion in pending liability lawsuits 
(Bates, Culter, and Clink, 1981 as cited in Kappeler, 2001).  It is unknown what 
percentage of cases was ruled for in favor of the petitioner or what the final pay out was. 
Settling cases out of court is also a growing trend.  One study in Texas by Vaughn, 
Cooper, and del Carmen (2001) found that of 630 lawsuits filed against the police, 159, 
or 25%, resulted in an out of court settlement with the average payout of $55,411 to the 
plaintiff (as cited in Kappeler, 2001). The cost of these lawsuits is not just monetary.  
They cost time and effort, which takes away from the performance of the other tasks 
beneficial to the city and department’s goal of community service. 
There are two primary areas of liability involving police pursuits in which law 
enforcement officers and agencies are sued in federal court.  They pertain to the 
person’s 4th and 14th Amendment civil rights covered under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.  
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Plaintiffs usually allege a violation of their substantive due process right to life or allege 
an excessive use of force was used during the process of the person’s arrest or seizure 
(Lilly, 1999). 
Two cases in 1985 concluded with rulings that strongly encouraged policy 
makers to adopt cautious, more conservative stances on some policies in order to avoid 
liability: Brandon v Holt (1985) and Kentucky v. Graham (1985).  In Brandon v. Holt 
(1985) the Supreme Court ruled that department policy makers, especially the chief 
executive, may be held personally liable for officers’ conduct if it is deemed that in his or 
her official capacity, he or she should have known of possible misconduct, even if they 
did not. In Kentucky v. Graham (1985), the Supreme Court ruled that an employee can 
be held personally liable for actions taken in his or her official capacity.  
The most important concern in a pursuit is for the lives of all parties involved.  
The first study, by the Physicians for Automotive Safety, gained national attention in 
1968.  They “reported the alarming estimates that 20% of all pursuits ended in someone 
being killed,” which, at the time, was approximately 500 per year (as cited in Walker, 
2005, p. 57). The same study found that “50% ended in at least one serious injury, and 
70% ended in an accident. Subsequent studies found these estimates to be 
exaggerated but confirmed the basic point that pursuits are highly dangerous” (as cited 
in Walker, 2005, p.57).  Engaging in a pursuit can have fatal consequences.  The latest 
statistics from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2008) indicated the 
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(National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2008) 
These numbers are likely somewhat lower than actual due to the fact that only about 
90% of states report fatalities to the NHTSA. The deaths in the above listed accidents 
were further broken down by the NCSA as to whether the deceased was an occupant in 
the police vehicle, the chased vehicle, a third party vehicle occupant, or was a 
nonoccupant/pedestrian. (See Appendix). 
The potential loss of life and the fear of lawsuit that usually accompanies it is 
always a strong motivating factor for departments to not expand their policy.  However, 
there is also the cost and relative scarcity of training facilities that can be considered a 
counter position.  Finding a facility that provides training for the maneuver may be a 
challenge for departments that want to begin using the maneuver.  Currently, there are 
no academies in south central Texas that offer the training, nor are any of the larger 
police organizations, such as San Antonio, Dallas, Fort Worth, Houston, or the Texas 
Department of Public Safety, currently using the maneuver or offering training. The only 
agency in the southeast Texas area found to utilize the technique is a suburb of Fort 
Worth, Texas: Dalworthington Gardens.  The maneuver is accepted and is being used 
by a variety of different agencies outside of Texas. Georgia, Washington, and 
Oklahoma state police currently use the maneuver, as do the police departments in 
Pine Bluff, Arkansas; Fairfax, Virginia; Brunswick, Georgia; and LaGrange, Georgia, to 
name a few.   
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The Georgia Public Safety Center in Forsyth, Georgia hosts training schools for 
surrounding departments, leasing its facility and a dormitory, which is complete with an 
on-site cafeteria and provides vehicles. The instructors are usually from the individual 
departments and have already been through the certification.  Costs associated with 
receiving the training includes travel, housing, meals.  Everything else is provided for, 
including the cars (Mills, personal communication, June 20, 2009). 
The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glenco, Georgia trains in the 
use of the maneuver in its Law Enforcement Advanced Driver Instructor Training 
Program. The cost of the course is approximately $2,600 per student.  That cost 
includes transportation to and from the airport, room and board, and tuition.  
Occasionally, grants are given for partial or full costs of the training (Anderson, personal 
communication, June 29, 2009). 
Departments wishing to pursue certification for its officers in the maneuver may 
consider hiring a certified instructor to come to their location and complete the 
instruction in their own town if they have access to a facility capable of accommodating 
the maneuver’s vehicle requirements.  Those departments will also have to provide at 
least two vehicles and be prepared to replace tires and rims as they are damaged 
throughout the training course. Departments adopting the maneuver should also 
consider the purchase of front grill guards.  The grill guard should be a complete guard 
that covers the entire front of the vehicle and wraps as far around the lights and front 
quarter panel as possible. This will help protect the patrol vehicle from damage and 
should significantly reduce any cost of repair associated with the completion of the 
maneuver.   The costs of grill guards vary, but a good one can be purchased for 
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approximately $300. Grill guards will likely pay for themselves in the long run, even if 
never used in the maneuver.  Grill guards provide vehicle front-end protection from 
damage commonly caused in minor fleet accidents, including those involving deer and 
other wildlife. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
During the research for this document, pursuits by the Huntsville, Texas Police 
Department were examined. The city of Huntsville has five main thoroughfares, as well 
as 142 centerline miles of city streets, on which the execution of the maneuver could be 
appropriate, either in specific areas or in their entirety.   IH 45, US 190, SH 30, SH 75, 
and SH 19 are the main thoroughfares, and pursuits have occurred on each during the 
time frame examined, including inter-jurisdictional pursuits.  Each of these roadways 
has different characteristics, from four-lane divided highways with a center barrier cable 
to only two opposing lanes of traffic. The city streets are sometimes very narrow, with 
parking oftentimes allowing only one vehicle passage in one direction at a time.  Speed 
limits vary from 20 mph in school zones to 70 mph on the highways.  This is a pretty 
typical semi-rural community.  There are areas within the city that would be conducive 
for conducting the maneuver at varying speeds. The Huntsville Police Department has a 
detailed policy on pursuits, including a post pursuit review.  The department currently 
allows and has a policy governing the use of the Magnum Spike strip for tire deflation of 
pursued vehicles but does not allow or train the use of the PIT maneuver. Pursuits 




Table 2. Huntsville Police Department Pursuits. 
 
Source:(Huntsville Police Department, 2009) 
The 2007 and 2008 numbers, 10 and 16, reflect 196% and 313% increase over the 
previous seven years average of 5.1 per year.  It should be noted, however, that this 
increase may be partially attributed to a change in administration and policy in 2007.  
The policy change broadened the department’s definition of what constitutes a pursuit.  
This policy change was also intended to reduce officer reluctance to formally announce 
they were in pursuit out of the usually unwarranted fear of disciplinary action for a policy 
violation identified during the subsequent pursuit review board.  
 The 62 pursuits were examined and given a rating of “yes” or “no” as to whether 
or not the officer(s) involved would have physically had the opportunity to conduct the 
maneuver. This ranking was based on the examination of the dynamics of the individual 
pursuits and considered the conditions present at the time, such as time of day, traffic 
conditions, weather, speeds, and proximity of the officer to the suspect.  The conditions 
were then set against the physical makeup of the roadway as well as the structures in 
the area of the reported route of pursuit. The ratings indicated that officers could have 
utilized the maneuver in 20 of the 62 pursuits.  Restricting the use of the maneuver to 
DWI’s and felonies reduces the number to 14.  Restricting the use to only known 
felonies further reduces the number to seven. Restricting the use of the maneuver to 
violent felonies reduces the number to five, two of which were incoming allied 
jurisdictional pursuits.  None of the 62 pursuits ended or involved a fatality collision. 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
1 3 5 7 8 4 8 10 16 62 
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 Should the department decide to move forward with adopting the maneuver, 
there are some local options for training.  Huntsville has a small municipal airport and is 
also less than an hour drive away from the Texas Engineering Extension in Bryan, 
Texas, and both have open areas sufficient for training purposes.  The department also 
has access to cars which, with a minimal investment of bumpers and tires, could also be 
utilized.  The department’s current pursuit policy is judgmental.  It is committed to a high 
level of training and education of its officers.  
 Finally, to answer two of the counter position concerns mentioned in this paper 
regarding the adoption of the maneuver, personal interviews were conducted with a 
member of the city’s Finance department as well as the City Risk coordinator.  In 
regards to the city’s adoption of the maneuver affecting the insurance coverage for the 
city vehicles or general liability, it would not affect any rates or cost of coverage for the 
city, which uses the Texas Municipal Intergovernmental Risk Pool (Share, personal 
communication, May 22, 2009). The same answer was given in regard to the adoption 
of the maneuver affecting the cities bond rating (Honea, personal communication, May 
26, 2009). The department appears to be a good candidate for the maneuver’s 
adoption. 
Most departments are highly committed to post academy in-service firearms 
training. Very few have continued or in-service training post academy in emergency 
driving or pursuit methods; yet, statistically, officers are more likely to be involved in a 
pursuit in their career than a shooting.  Departments should research their own pursuit 
statistics to get an accurate assessment of the local trends and determine for 
themselves whether PIT training is something they wish to pursue.  In doing so, many 
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departments may want to look at refocusing a portion of their training efforts and 
budgets toward this area. 
 Departments that do not have a pursuit policy should immediately take steps to 
formulate one.  Departments who have not updated their policy are recommended to 
revisit them and strongly consider the adoption of stop sticks or spike strips for slowing 
pursuits and also the use of the PIT maneuver to effectively end pursuits.  It should be 
noted that spike strips do not end pursuits, they merely slow them down; the PIT 
maneuver brings an end to the pursuit.  There appears to be strong support from the 
Supreme Court for officer and agency protection, even in the event of accidental death 
and serious injury.  If departments are unable or unwilling to adopt the PIT maneuver 
until new and developing technologies come available, it is recommended that as many 
spike strips as needed be purchased for full deployment.  This will increase the odds of 
opportunity to have them deployed in a timely manner in a strategic location. 
 Ultimately, the decision to adopt or not to adopt the maneuver is up to the 
individual agency and must take into account the local political and community outlooks, 
customs, prerogatives, and demands set against the varied agency philosophies and 
resource capabilities (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2004).  That being 
said, there appears to be no better time in history to place this tool into law enforcement 
agency policy if it is not already there. 
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0 15 3 1 19 1998 2 201 105 14 322 
0 22 0 0 22 1999 3 212 99 5 319 
0 20 4 2 26 2000 7 190 103 10 310 
0 23 3 4 30 2001 4 223 121 22 370 
1 14 13 0 28 2002 6 248 121 11 386 
0 25 9 0 34 2003 6 229 106 13 354 
2 25 9 1 37 2004 9 214 108 12 343 
0 32 6 1 39 2005 5 234 104 16 359 
0 32 4 3 39 2006 3 271 125 11 410 
0 34 8 2 44 2007 9 296 98 21 424 
0 21 7 3 31 2008 5 235 77 17 334 
(National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2008) 
 
